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Pashtunistan's Future: The Global Executive
or a Regional Solution
JOSHUA A. KURTZMAN*
ABSTRACT
This note explores the transnational security issues associated with
the Pashtunistan region following the withdrawal of NATO from
Afghanistan in 2014. More specifically, at a time when this region is at a
religious, governance, and globalization crossroads, this note posits that
only two alternatives exist for addressing the security situation in this
region. First, a global executive, or executives, could use their power to
exert transnational security pressure through drone strikes or other
pseudo-military alternatives. A second alternative, and one which this
note considers much more promising, is the development of a "NATO-
like" organization of Muslim nations to assist one another in addressing
internal security issues. The note emphasizes that current global trends,
particularly in the Muslim world, may create the impetus for such an
organization and that the alternative would give rise to a continued
unwanted expansion of executive power.
INTRODUCTION
Pashtunistan encompasses the western portion of Pakistan, which
includes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the
southern and eastern portions of Afghanistan, most notably the
Kandahar province that was the birthplace of the Taliban movement.'
Since the drawing of the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, in 1897, tribal Pashtuns in the region have always hoped
* Executive Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 21; J.D.
2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.S. 2001, The United States Military
Academy at West Point. I would like to thank Corinne Lewis, a partner at the
international law firm of Lex Justi who focuses on international human rights law, whose
mentorship and guidance greatly assisted in the editing and revising of earlier drafts.
1. CARL FORSBERG, INST. FOR THE STUD. OF WAR, AFGHANISTAN REPORT 3: THE
TALIBAN'S CAMPAIGN FOR KANDAHAR 9 (2009), available at http://www.understandingwar
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and worked toward uniting the region again under the banner of
Pashtunistan. 2 It has often been thought that Pashtunistan was split in
this manner as a "divide-and-rule British imperial decision"3 that was
made to disenfranchise and divide the power of the tribal Pashtuns.4
While the Durand Line has, in theory, split the Pashtuns, it has not
eliminated their common language-Pashto---or their tribal code of
conduct-Pashtunwali.5
Following the establishment of the Durand Line, Sir Percival Sykes
stated,6 "Durand served his country right well, and generations yet
unborn will benefit from the Durand Line that he negotiated."7 This
statement, which was published in Sykes' 1926 book, in hindsight, now
seems preposterous.8 This 1600-mile dividing line between Pakistan and
Afghanistan serves as an artificial boundary that ostensibly divides
what is arguably the most dangerous ethnocentric region in the world
between two nations.9 While this line has largely been ignored by the
Pashtun tribesmen who live near it and who continue to live under the
self-governance code of Pashtunwali, it has been impossible to avoid this
region when examining the scourge of transnational terrorism.10
Security issues have plagued this region since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. This instability has led to a prevalence of transnational
terrorism organizations taking root in the region with no single
government who can address the region effectively or comprehensively.
Pashtunistan was chosen as the case study because it appears
ungovernable. An ungoverned space is defined by four characteristics:
(i) the lack of state penetration of society; (ii) the inability of the state to
2. Pepe Escobar, Welcome to Pashtunistan, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SouthAsiafKKO6DfOl.html.
3. Id.
4. See Scott Shane, The War In Pashtunistan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/12/06/weekinreview /06shane.html?pagewanted=all&_ r=0
(explaining how the Durand Line has split the Pashtun people by placing 12 million
Pashtuns within the borders of Afghanistan and 27 million on the Pakistani side of the
border).
5. Id.
6. A British soldier, diplomat, traveler, and writer who wrote extensively on Iran and
who was a senior British military and governmental representative in Pakistan, India,
and Persia in the late 19th century. See ANTONY WYNN, OUR MAN IN PERSIA: THE LIFE OF
SIR PERCIVAL SYKES-EXPLORER, CONSUL, SOLDIER, Spy 1-3 (2001).
7. David Rose, The Man Who Drew the Fatal Durand Line, STANDPOINT (Mar. 2011),
http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/3728/full.
8. Id.
9. Anne Marie Payne, The Durand Line: History and Implications of British Imperial
Policy in Afghanistan, at 3 (May 2012) (unpublished honors research thesis, The Ohio
State University) (available at http://kb.osu.eduldspace/bitstream/handle/1811/52071/Ann
ePayneHonorsThesis.pdf?sequence=l).
10. Id. at 3-4.
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a monopolize the use of force; (iii) the inability of the state to control its
borders; and (iv) whether the state is subject to external intervention by
other states."
First, state penetration can be evaluated by the "presence or
absence of state institutions, the state of physical infrastructure, the
prevalence of an informal or shadow economy, and social and cultural
resistance to state penetration."12 Section I of this note addresses
Pakistan's nominal sovereignty over a large swath of Pashtunistan and
Pakistan's lack of official government presence within this region.
Instead of exerting its authority, the Pakistani government governs
from an adjacent province, and any attempt to increase its influence is
looked at as impermissible encroachment by the Pashtuns.
Second, the presence of a number of extremist organizations and
their actions targeting both the Afghan and Pakistani governments
demonstrates that the sovereign powers do not enjoy a monopoly on the
use of force. These extremist organizations are able to advance their
interests through the use of force, albeit it in a less conventional
manner, at a level almost equivalent to the governments of Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Third, Pashtuns living along the Durand Line ignore the
border and do not view it as legitimate, thus satisfying the element
describing control of the borders.13 Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) presence in Afghanistan and the drone program
of the United States in Pashtunistan adeptly exhibit the external
intervention already ongoing in the region.
In light of these conditions, NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in
2014 will likely produce an internationally significant security void in
Pashtunistan. This note argues that there are two potential ways this
situation could be addressed: one solution is through the actions of a
global or transnational executive(s); another solution is through
cooperation among Muslim nations to assist in policing their own
region. It then argues that the second approach is superior to the first
and should be pursued. This note begins with an analysis of
Pashtunistan's impact on the global environment in the context of
existing security threats in the region, the 2014 NATO withdrawal plan,
and forecasted governance structures in the region post-2014. Next, this
11. ANGEL RABASA ET AL., UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING
TERRORISM RISKS 3 (2007).
12. Id.
13. See DAVID ISBY, AFGHANISTAN: GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES: A NEw HISTORY OF THE
BORDERLAND 32, 461 (2010) ("There are 350 known unofficial crossing places to the
current Afghanistan-Pakistan border, many more in practice. . . . [T]he Afghan Pashtun
[during the war with the Soviets] did not view the border as legitimate and that practice
has carried forward to the modern-day Taliban.").
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note defines the characteristics of a global executive, discusses the
emergence of a global executive, and analyzes transnational security
law impacts of the global executive. The note concludes by addressing
the benefits and potential challenges of encouraging and fostering a
regional solution.
I. PASHTUNISTAN'S IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL STAGE
The nineteenth and early twentieth century history of Afghanistan
was a mere preamble to its current place on the world's stage. The story
of the Durand Line is simply a "century-long saga of predatory
colonialism, postcolonial insecurities, and incessant conflict . . . [and] a
tale of colonial cartography bequeathed to a postcolonial formation,
bringing in its wake bitter fruits of oppression, violence, and war."14
Since the Russian departure from Afghanistan at the close of the Cold
War, and the corresponding rise of the Taliban, Afghanistan's neighbors
have been concerned with the upswing of Islamic fundamentalism. In
the 1990s, Russia and Iran provided weaponry, training, fuel, and
logistical resources to the Northern Alliance.' 5 This assistance was
provided to prevent the spillover of "Islamic fundamentalism and anti-
Shi'aism" into their countries.16 This region rose to the forefront of the
global stage in a new and dynamic manner after serving as the genesis
and operational headquarters for the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.
A. Regional Conditions and the Rise of Extremism
Pakistan is now well-known for its "suicide bombers, U.S. drone
strikes, car bombs, the Taliban, a power crisis, displaced people, water
shortages, and hostile relations with its neighbor, India."17 These issues
overwhelmingly rise out of the tribal areas dominated by the Pashtun
people but have an impact on the world at large. While nuclear powers
India and Pakistan exist together in a near-constant state of conflict
14. Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring
Failures of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
Frontier, 36 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 48 (2010).
15. See Fiona Simon, Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilsouthasia/ 1552994.stm (explaining that the Northern Alliance
is made up of non-Pashtun ethnic groups who were "united only in their desire to topple
the ruling Taliban").
16. Hafeez Malik, The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Its Impact on
Eurasia, 6 BROwN J. WORLD AFF. 135, 143 (1999).
17. Orla Orla MacRae & Osman Haneef, Fathoming FATA The Taliban Insurgency in
Pakistan's Tribal Area, 6 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 115, 115 (2011).
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and tension that is felt globally, Pashtunistan is not responsible for this
inter-state tension. However, the security threat arising from
Pashtunistan is just as troublesome as this inter-state conflict and has
arguably garnered more attention from global powers. This section
examines the economic conditions leading to extremism in Pashtunistan
and the security situation in the Pashtunistan areas in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
A vast majority of Muslim countries in the Middle East and Central
Asia are in dire need of economic modernization, technical advice, and
policy guidance to encourage economic growth.1 8 Nowhere is this need
more prominent than in Pashtunistan. On the Pakistan side, the
economy is structured to benefit traditional Maliks and radical Mullahs
to the detriment of the local population, as evidenced by significant aid
money being diverted from its intended recipient.19 This lack of
economic development contributes more to the growth of the insurgency
than to a fervent belief in Islamic fundamentalism, as individuals see
that joining the Pakistani Taliban, or a similar extremist group,
provides an economic pathway to personal stability that is otherwise
unavailable. 20 An.example of this troubling economic model is exhibited
by the pay-scale difference between a low-level Pakistani Taliban
fighter and a government policeman in the region. A "rank and file"
Taliban fighter receives approximately $190 a month, while the
government provides its "tribal levies," which are hired based on merit,
a paltry $43 a month. 21
The situation in Afghanistan is no better and only appears to be
worsening. After the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan
people felt they would return to a state of peace and economic growth
18. See generally Regional Economic Outlook Update: Middle East and Central Asia
Department, INT'L MONETARY FUND 1 (Apr. 20, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.imf.orglexternal
/pubs/ft/reo/2012/mcdleng/pdflmena-update04l2.pdf (discussing the issues faced by
economies in the Middle East and Central Asia and how the Arab Spring and conflict has
only exacerbated already weak economies while dealing with a global recession).
19. McRae & Haneef, supra note 17, at 120 (discussing Nasreen Ghufran, Pushtun
Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the NWFP of Pakistan, 49 ASIAN SuRY.
1106 (2009) ("The Pakistani government's failure to provide the people of FATA
desperately needed socioeconomic resources-including basic facilities in health,
education, and communications-made it easier for Taliban militants to gain a foothold in
the area. Furthermore, the government's inability to initiate both political and
administrative reforms contributed to a vacuum in vital services that has been filled by
Taliban and their supporters.")).
20. Id.
21. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, PAKISTAN: COUNTERING MILITANCY IN FATA, CRISIS
GROUP ASIA REPORT 10 (2009); see also Khalid Khan, Pakistan's Tribal Police: Underpaid
and Undervalued, THE AFPAK CHANNEL (Sep. 9, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://afpak.foreignpolicy
.com/posts/2009/09/09/pakistans tribal-police-underpaid-and undervalued.
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but, instead, have faced two more decades of conflict.22 According to the
World Bank, "97 percent of Afghanistan's roughly $15.7 billion gross
domestic product comes from international military and development
aid and spending in the country by foreign troops. The economy is
already contracting as troops prepare to leave, and future growth will be
slower, especially in urban areas and areas of conflict." 23 Unfortunately,
no area in Afghanistan is in a greater state of conflict than the
Pashtunistan region. This conflict ensures that the economic conditions
driving male economic providers to extremist organizations will exist
and potentially worsen going forward.
The security situation in Pashtun regions of Afghanistan has been
worsening since the Taliban resurgence in the mid-2000s. Much of
northern and western Afghanistan has witnessed drastically improving
security conditions and reconstruction. 24 The opposite is true in the
Pashtun regions. Since President Obama announced the "troop surge,"
attack levels have generally remained consistent or increased. 25 This
ultra-violent environment, experiencing almost three thousand violent
acts a month,26 is made even more troubling by the fact that "[n]o
Afghan army battalion is capable of operating without U.S. advisers, ....
policemen spend more time shaking down people for bribes than
patrolling, [and] front-line [Afghan] units often do not receive the fuel,
food and spare parts they need to function."27 This confluence of factors:
foreshadows the fact that the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan will be
largely ungoverned once NATO withdraws in 2014, like they were prior
to September 11, 2001.
The security situation in Pakistan-controlled portions of
Pashtunistan is worse than it is in Afghanistan. The mountainous
region of Pashtunistan around the Durand Line has been referred to as
the "grand central station of global Islamic militancy."28 This region is
22. VICTORIA SCHOFIELD, AFGHAN FRONTIER: FEUDING AND FIGHTING IN CENTRAL ASIA
322 (2003).
23. Editorial, Afghanistan's Economic Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/opinion/afghanistans-economic-challenges.html.
24. Michael Mihalka, Pashtunistan, NATO and the Global War on Terror: "If you don't
fight, you cannot have peace in Afghanistan", 6 CHINA & EURASIA F. Q. 1, 51 (2008).
25. Spencer Ackerman, Military's Own Report Card Gives Afghan Surge an F, WIRED
(Sep. 27, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/09/surge-report-card/.
26. Id.
27. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Afghan Security Force's Rapid Expansion Comes at a Cost
as Readiness Lags, WASH. POsT (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na
tional-security/afghan-security-forces-rapid-expansion-comes-at-a-cost-as-readiness-lags/2
012/10/20/38af200a-16cb-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b story.html.





where young men, bent on participating in transnational terror, journey
to learn the skills necessary to deliver death and destruction against
their perceived enemies.29 The Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-i-Taliban,
and the insurgency, which is targeting the Pakistani government from
within, further complicates this global issue. Proponents describe this
conflict as "a rural, ultra-religious, nationalist movement fighting tooth-
and-nail a corrupt, urban-based government as if they were a post-
colonial fantasy of the noble tribal savage-a la Rousseau-fighting the
colonialist West."30 This insurgency has already successfully
assassinated Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, conducted
regular suicide bombings in major cities, and attacked the Pakistani
Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi.3 ' Like Afghanistan, these conditions
exhibit that this region will remain a global and transnational security
threat following the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
B. The Plan for NATO's Withdrawal
The 2014 NATO withdrawal plan, and the residual presence of
NATO in Pashtunistan post-2014, is the subject of numerous national
and international debates and significant anxiety throughout both the
region and Western governments. While Mikhail Gorbachev, in his
memoirs, described Russia's travails in Afghanistan as a "hopeless
military adventure," the same cannot be said for NATO's efforts.32
NATO's guiding principle while in Afghanistan was to make every effort
to "enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the
country and ensure that the country can never again be a safe haven for
terrorists."33 Any counterinsurgency effort has a small likelihood of
long-term success when the insurgent has a reliable and largely
unchallenged cross-border sanctuary.34  Pakistani portions of
Pashtunistan have served as this sanctuary. This condition will
continue to hamper NATO's efforts as the conflict comes to a close.
A large degree of the long-term stability of Afghanistan, and a
fortiori Pashtunistan, is dependent upon the future performance of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). NATO is optimistic that the
29. Id.
30. Escobar, supra note 2.
31. Scott Shane, The War In Pashtunistan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/12/06/weekinreview/06shane.html?pagewanted=all&r-0.
32. SCHOFIELD, supra note 22, at 325.
33. NATO and Afghanistan, NATO (last updated June 18, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm?.
34. See, e.g., Rabasa, supra note 11. In this case, Pashtunistan serves as the
ungoverned cross-border sanctuary that has given NATO forces in eastern and southern
Afghanistan so much difficulty.
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handover to ANSF will be successful and contends that "Afghan soldiers
are increasingly taking the lead in operations on Afghan soil . . . [the]
army and police, have proven able to maintain security in those areas
which have already entered into transition."35 This optimism
surrounding the proficiency of the Afghan security apparatus has been
dampened by a troubling spate of "insider attacks," which have reduced
the credibility of the ANSF as a reliable force following NATO's
withdrawal. 36 While it is difficult to predict the success of the ANSF
securing their country effectively, it is apparent that Afghan National
Security Forces, while reportedly improving, are not yet an unwavering
and incorruptible organization that can be relied on by the Western
world to independently solve the Pashtunistan problem.
In May 2012, the leaders of NATO agreed upon an exit strategy that
would allow NATO countries to withdraw over the course of two years.
First, in mid-2013, NATO forces turned over security responsibility to
Afghan security forces and assumed an advisory and support role.37 This
turnover of security responsibility specified that Afghan forces will take
control of all combat missions while receiving only logistical and enabler
(helicopter, drone, and supply) support from NATO forces.38 The
withdrawal plan demands that, by the end of 2014, an overwhelming
number of NATO forces will be completely removed from Afghanistan
after thirteen years of conflict. 39 A troubling part of this withdrawal
plan is that Afghanistan cannot afford to maintain its security forces
and is relying on the donations of NATO countries to maintain their
entire $4.1 billion annual defense and security budget.40 This does not
portend a bright future for the security environment in Pashtunistan if
the international community fails to satisfy the budgetary needs of the
Afghan security apparatus.
35. Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan Issued by the Heads of State and
Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 21, 2012.
36. David S. Cloud, As 'Insider Attacks' Grow, So Does U.S.-Afghanistan Divide, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/07/worldlla-fg-afghan-insider-
attacks-20121107 ('There have been 41 insider attacks by Afghan soldiers and police this
year, killing 35 Americans and 22 people from other countries with forces in Afghanistan.
Cmdr. William Speaks, a Pentagon spokesman, said 'significantly more' Afghans than
foreigners have died in the attacks.").








C. Forecasted Governance Structures Remaining in 2014
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have not inspired
confidence in Western countries, and this condition has, unfortunately,
not improved over time. NATO and Western nations now worry about
the fragility of the Afghan government post-withdrawal, upcoming
Afghan elections, President Karzai's unwillingness to sign a long-term
security agreement, and the lack of control the Pakistani government
can exert over its portion of Pashtunistan.
1. Concerns with the Afghan Government
The history of government in Afghanistan is a tumultuous one, and
the current incarnation is no less so. 41 In 2001, NATO, and the United
States, 42 felt a strong centralized government in Kabul was
indispensable for keeping the ethnically disparate nation together.4 3
This view is now tragically considered foolish by many who believe such
a plan was not worth the time or cost because it might never have been
possible to unite Afghanistan under a strong central government in the
first place.44 The history of Afghanistan disappointingly concurs with
this updated assessment. The recent history of Afghan governance also
complicates withdrawal efforts as counterinsurgency experts attest;
success in a conflict like this is largely predicated on the quality of the
government you are supporting.45 In the case of Afghanistan, the
government is among the most corrupt in the world; "[ojut of 180
countries, Transparency International ranks [Afghanistan], in terms of
corruption, 179th, better only than Somalia."46 This corruption, even
when NATO forces are present in large numbers and still have an
impact in the country, does not bode well for the future stability of this
41. Adam Ritscher, A Brief History of Afghanistan, Speech at a Students Against War
Teach-In (2002) (available at http://www.afghangovernment.com/ (discussing the series of
coups, assassinations, and autocratic rule that has been prevalent in Afghanistan ruling
bodies over the course of the last 200 years).
42. At this point the terms are almost interchangeable due to the United States'
influence over NATO.
43. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power Before the
U.S. Withdrawal, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 54, 54-55 (2011).
44. Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia & J. Alexander Their, Defining Success in
Afghanistan: What Can the United States Accept?, FOREIGN AFF. 2010, available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66450/stephen-biddle-fotini-christia-and-j-alexander
-thier/defining-success-in-afghanistan.
45. Robert D. Blackwill, Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least
Bad Option, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 42, 43 (2011).
46. Id.
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government. Afghanistan's corruption also negatively affects its ability
to provide credible governance to its people, or its ability to secure
Pashtunistan.
Three significant occurrences have led to the Afghan government
losing almost all credibility in the eyes of its people. First, after the
invasion of 2001, many Afghans thought they would have much more
local self-rule and autonomy than they currently enjoy.47 Next, the
Afghan federal government also lost a tremendous amount of credibility
based upon the 2009 presidential election, which many believe was rife
with corruption. 48 Finally, the government has been browbeaten by the
insurgency's efforts to target Afghan civilians.. A political science
professor in Kabul said these efforts "show the world the Afghan
government is too weak to prevent [these sorts of attacks] ."49 All of these
factors, coupled with the inherent corruption of the Afghan government,
make it very likely that the eastern and southern regions. of
Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-will be ungoverned or ineffectively
governed by weak local governance institutions following the
withdrawal of NATO in 2014.
Further complicating the Afghan government situation, and causing
regional uncertainty, is the Afghan presidential election scheduled for
April 5, 2014. The Afghan Constitution prohibits President Karzai from
pursuing another term as president, but no Afghan chief executive has
ever left office of his own volition.50 Assuming this election occurs as
scheduled, there are two good reasons for the international community
to be concerned. First, the timing of this election is troublesome as a
new, and therefore relatively inexperienced, national leader will assume
control of Afghanistan as NATO security forces are exiting the country.
Transitions of power, particularly in nascent democracies, are fragile.
To add the withdrawal of the NATO "security blanket" to the turbulence
of this transition allows one to infer that the Pashtunistan security
situation may not be well addressed. Second, the Afghan elections in
2009, when over 150,000 NATO soldiers were in the country, were
incredibly violent, which kept many voters away from the polls,
particularly in the Pashtun areas of the country.51 If Pashtun voters are
disenfranchised again, further instability could result. The situation on
47. Barfield, supra note 43, at 54.
48. See Sabrina Tavernise & Abdul Waheed Wafa, U.N. Official Acknowledges
Widespread Fraud' in Afghan Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes
.com/2009/10/12/world /asia/12afghan.html? r=O.
49. Mihalka, supra note 24, at 55.
50. Id. at 64-65.
51. Matthew Rosenberg, Afghans Say Presidential Election Date Is Set for April 2014,




the Afghan side of Pashtunistan does not encourage anyone familiar
with the region to believe that the transnational security threat
emanating from there can be addressed independently by the Afghan
government.
2. Concerns with the Pakistani Government
For the areas of Pashtunistan that fall within Pakistan, the
governmental concerns are not as complex as those in Afghanistan. This
is because there is ostensibly no Pakistani government control of the
Pashtuns, and the Pakistani government is largely consumed with
preventing its own demise from its Hindu neighbor, nuclear-power
India.
The portions of Pashtunistan that fall within the borders of
Pakistan make up a region known as the FATA, which is bordered to
the east by the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), which is closer to
Islamabad. While the governor and bureaucracy of the NWFP are
responsible for the administration of the FATA, there is no indication
that they actually exert any control over the administration of the
FATA.52 Instead, control of the FATA has been ceded to prominent
Islamic Pashtun leaders who do not recognize the old practice of local
tribal councils participating with an agent of the Pakistani
government.53 This control has led to increased "radicalization of its
population [that] seems to be an unstoppable process."54 This lack of
control and increased radicalization has led to efforts to control the area
by the Pakistani government. These efforts have been largely
unsuccessful and have further distanced the Pashtuns from the
government of Pakistan, thus sending the Pashtuns messages about the
goals of their federal government.55 This radicalization, in combination
with the central government's inability to exert any control over the
Pashtun areas of the country, creates a situation with an increasing
likelihood that Pashtunistan will remain an ungoverned space that is
52. See Ijaz Khan & Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, NBR Analysis: Challenges Facing
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 19 NAT'L BUREAU ASIAN RES. 1,
19 (2008), available at www.nbr.org /publications/analysis/pdf/voll9no3.pdf.
53. TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER, PASHTUNISTAN, PAKISTAN'S SHIFTING STRATEGY? (May
2012), available at http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Pashtunistan%20Shifti
ng%20Strategy.pdf.
54. Id.
55. See generally HUSAIN HAQQANI, PAKISTAN: BETWEEN MOSQUE AND MILITARY 169
(2005) (discussing how Baluch & Pashtun nationalists interpreted Pakistani military
action in Pashtunistan as a provocation motivated by the desire of the government and
the Pakistani army to centralize authority over the region).
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the "grand central station" of Islamic fundamentalism and
transnational terror.56
Compounding the already troubling governance conditions in
Pashtun regions of Pakistan is the government's preoccupation with
India. While Pashtunistan, and the Pashtun population generally,
becomes more radicalized and ungovernable, the Pakistani government
and elites continue to focus on the threat from India. Addressing the
threat from India has become such a preoccupation that "[pirojection of
[the] threat from India is fundamental to the survival of the Pakistani
establishment."5 7 The conflict with India, the government's lack of
control over the Pashtuns, the restructuring of the country, and the
struggle for democracy are all links in the same chain of instability that
weighs down the government of Pakistan.58 This chain prevents
Pakistan from adequately addressing its Pashtunistan problem,
requiring this transnational space to be addressed by the world at large.
II. THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL EXECUTIVE
The concept of a global or transnational chief executive has
developed over the latter parts of the twentieth century and early part
of this century as an unintended consequence of increased global
interconnectedness. A confluence of security and economic events served
to usher in an age in the United States and, perhaps a handful of other
countries, where chief executives' power and global reach is unrivaled
by their predecessors or contemporaries in the legislature. This section
will attempt to define the amorphous concept of a global executive,
explain the emergence of the global executive, and examine how the
global executive's exercise of power affects Pashtunistan and the global
security environment generally.
Before the examination of what defines a global executive, it is
necessary to understand a fundamental principle: to act, a global
executive must be advancing or enforcing an international norm of some
nature. For our purposes here, it is the President of the United States
who has been addressing Pashtunistan and advancing the norms
outlined below. There are "three layers to the international cultural
56. Jason Burke et. al., Pashtunistan Holds Key to Obama Mission, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 14, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/15/afghanistan-pakistan-oba
ma.
57. AYEsHA SIDDIQA-AGHA, PAKISTAN'S ARMS PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY BUILDUP,
1979-1999: IN SEARCH OF A POLICY 56 (2003).
58. Ijaz Khan, Contending Identities of Pakistan and the Issue of Democratic
Governance, 2 PEACE & DEMOCRACY S. ASIA 50, 53, 55 (2006).
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environments in which national security policies are made."59 One layer
includes security alliances (e.g., NATO, the Organization of American
States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and security
agreements (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty, the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty).6 0 The next layer is the world political culture
that recognizes the "rules of sovereignty and international law" and the
"transnational political discourse" carried out by various
nongovernmental organizations.6 1 The final layer provides a norm that
a global executive may enforce, which is the "international patterns of
amity and enmity."62 This norm shapes our perceptions of nations,
people, or cultures based upon how they interact with each other.63 All
of these norms or layers are present in the U.S. President's approach to
Pashtunistan.
A. Global Executive Defined
Attempting to define or describe something as amorphous as a
"global executive" is exceedingly difficult, but it is less complicated in
the United States post 9/11 because of the United States government's
assumed role in furthering its own, and its allies', security interests. To
that end, a global executive, in this case the President of the United
States, can be defined as a chief executive from a hegemonic power, who
serves at a time when great economic and security concerns exist, and
who exercises transnational power with little or no legislative oversight
or acquiescence.
It should be relatively apparent why a global executive must be the
chief executive of a hegemonic power. While a chief executive from a
nonhegemonic power may have a transnational impact through a
smaller military intervention, it is exceedingly difficult for this impact
to be global in scope or last for an indeterminate length of time. The
checks that limit an executive's ability to have a transnational impact
can come from a variety of sources. First, an executive can be limited by
the source of his power of persuasion. For example, "an executive whose
power is based on personal charisma . . . finds it necessary to spend
59. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt & Peter J. Katzenstein, Norms, Identity,
and Culture in National Security, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMs AND




63. Id. (discussing how Canada and Cuba are viewed and treated differently by the
United States government based upon their position, whether real or imagined, regarding
the United States and our interests).
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precious time and energy reinforcing the public's favorable
perceptions." 64 Additionally, and more tangibly, the limiting effects on
executive power can be produced by "constitutional limitations, strong
liberal tradition, powerful legislature . . . political parties, the press, and
the electorate."65
President Clinton's presidency is an example of how even the chief
executive of a hegemonic power may not have a global impact unless the
right conditions exist. During President Clinton's first term, the vast
majority of his impact and accomplishments took place primarily on the
domestic front and had nearly no global impact.66 It was not until the
latter part of his first term and his second term that he agreed to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and influenced the
NATO intervention in Kosovo. 67 Very little is said about the impacts the
chief executive of Mexico or Canada had on the ratification of NAFTA.68
Instead, the focus of the agreement, and the debate over NAFTA since
its signing, is on President Clinton's role and the effects the agreement
has had on the world.69 Similarly, while many other nations were
involved in the Kosovo operation, it was President Clinton who was seen
as the leader and dominant influence on the intervention. 70 It was
President Clinton who, after the breakdown of NATO-backed peace
talks, made the decision to launch a bombing campaign in what was
ostensibly a civil war.71 These two actions, one economic and one
defense-related, are perfect examples of a global executive carrying out
actions illustrative of its hegemonic power.
64. MARCUS E. ETHRIDGE & HOWARD HANDELMAN, POLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD: A
COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 197 (6th ed. 2010).
65. S.N. RAY, MODERN COMPARATIVE POLITICS: APPROACHES, METHODS AND ISSUES
225 (3rd ed. 2004).
66. See generally American President: A Reference Resource - Bill Clinton, MILLER
CENTER, http://millercenter.org /president/clintonlessays/biography/print (last visited Nov.
9, 2012) (explaining how President Clinton's first-term was largely consumed with
addressing the national deficit and a failed attempt to institute a national health care
system).
67. See generally Jim Garamone, Clinton Makes Case for Kosovo Intervention, U.S.
DEPT. OF DEFENSE (Mar. 24, 1999), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=420
01 (discussing President Clinton's views on why force may be necessary in Kosovo).
68. See generally Andrea Ford, A Brief History of NAFlA, TIME (Dec. 30, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1868997,00.html (discussing NAFTA's impact
on trade generally and recommendations for Mexico's and Canada's focus).
69. See id.
70. See generally Sebastien Barthe & Charles-Philippe David, Kosovo 1999: Clinton,
Coercive Diplomacy, and the Use of Analogies in Decision Making, 8 Whitehead J. Dipl. &
Int'l Rel. 85 (2007).
71. See Benjamin Schwarz & Christopher Layne, The Case Against Intervention in




A president will likely have the ability to exercise increased war
powers during a time when global economic or security concerns make
the executive's constituency demand action and allow for the use of
expansive supra-constitutional powers. The idea of state survival, or the
survival of the state's values and respect for sovereignty, is frequently
invoked as a rationale for expanding executive power. This concept was
summarized well by President Roosevelt's attorney general during
World War II, Francis Biddle, when he said, "the Constitution has never
greatly bothered any wartime president."72 Similarly, President Lincoln,
when discussing governmental power during the Civil War stated, "[a]re
all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
pieces, lest that one be violated?"73 While these two statements arose
out of security concerns, they speak to a broader principle: when exigent
circumstances exist, an executive may exercise a level of power above
what is normally permitted or expected. There are fewer instances of
global executives asserting themselves during an international economic
crisis-President Roosevelt did so on a national level during the Great
Depression-largely because the world economy has only recently
become globalized and interconnected in a way that allows for a chief
executive to have a global impact. 74 Infra, this paper will examine how
these occurrences, both defense and economic in nature, are more
prevalent today than ever before, thus allowing a modern global
executive to emerge and engage the world on a variety of substantive
issues throughout their time in office.
Finally, to be a global executive, one must exercise power outside
the confines of legislative approval and oversight or through creative
legal interpretation that serves to expand an executive's authority or
mandate. To return to an example used previously, the Kosovo
intervention is a perfect example of the United States President
operating as a global executive and exercising power outside of
72. ScoTT M. MATHESON, JR., PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PERILOUS TIMES
75 (2009).
73. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, MESSAGE TO CONGRESS (July 4, 1861), reprinted in The Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series IV, I, 311-321 (1900) (discussing the
habeas corpus litigation on-going in multiple courts throughout the Union).
74. As evidence of this proposition: the World Trade Organization, whose purpose is to
promote free trade and has become closely associated with globalization, was founded in
1995; and the Group of 8 (G8), which holds yearly meetings to establish consensus among
industrialized nations on economic growth and other issues, was initially formed in 1975
and only fully formed in 1998. See, e.g., Profile: World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 15, 2012, 11:31 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/country-profiles/2429503.stm;
Stephanie Lee, Alexandra Silver & Zachary Laub, The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized
Nations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (last updated June 14, 2013), http://www.cfr.org
/global-governance/group-eight-g8-industrialized-nations/p10647.
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legislative oversight. In this case, the United States House of
Representatives demanded the President seek congressional approval
under the War Powers Resolution and was rebuffed.75 The Kosovo
operation "was the first combat operation to continue beyond sixty days
without express statutory authorization, in apparent contravention of
the War Powers Resolution."76 This was a defining act that is
illustrative of how a global executive takes action-irrespective of a
desire of the legislature to impact the policy-that has transnational
effects.
B. The Emergence of the Global Executive
The administration has gone to great lengths to avoid
the legal restraints that normally would apply under our
legal system. They have argued that the laws of war are
not applicable because we are fighting a new type of
enemy. They have argued the criminal laws are not
applicable because we are fighting a war.77
I can understand why some administration lawyers
might have wanted ambiguity so that every hypothetical
option is theoretically open, even those the President
has said he does not want to exercise. But war doesn't
occur in theory and our troops are not served by
ambiguity. They are crying out for clarity.78
What Senators Jeff Bingaman and Jon McCain are expressing is
their frustration with the powers of the modern global executive. As
Barry Friedman stated, "as globalization proceeds, executive power will
be enhanced simply because of the nature of the decisions being
made."79 This phenomenon has occurred in Western Europe as
integration into the European Union occurs: "executive authority has
75. See generally Letter from Representative Tom Campbell and John Conyers to
President Clinton (Dec. 1, 1999) (available at http://www.house.gov/campbel/990219.htm)
(asking President Clinton to delink the military sanctions against Iraq).
76. Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1149, 1154 (2001).
77. Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/pressitem.
cfm?party-rep&id=252718.
78. 151 CONG. REC. S11062 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain).




increased vis-a-vis the legislative bodies."80 These complaints and
Friedman's assertion highlight three key elements that outline and
explain the emergence of the global executive in the twenty-first
century: an inability of constitutional limits to control the global
executive, a crisis or multitude of crises that allows an executive to
expand his powers by invoking the notion of state survival, and the
global reach and interconnectedness of problems that allow an executive
to have a transnational impact.
The global executive has emerged over the last thirty years in part
because constitutional systems have significant difficulty in controlling
the actions of a nation's chief executive. This is true both in economic
and security crises. First, an apt example of supraconstitutional powers
in a security context occurred in Great Britain in 1969 and continued
until the early 2000s. In 1969, Operation Banner, an emergency
deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland, was launched in
response to rising tensions between Protestants and Catholics in
Belfast.8 ' Significantly, the deployment of the British military was not
based on United Kingdom law.82 Instead, the British Prime Minister
ordered the deployment in response to a request from the Prime
Minister of Northern Ireland.83 This state of affairs and action by global
executives is now commonplace with the drone program of the United
States, and its impacts in Yemen, Pakistan, and North Africa as the
most apparent examples.8 4 The emergence of the global executive in the
modern age of terrorism has been expedited by the fact that states now
"take up the challenge of protecting civilians and place it center stage in
the life of the State" and that constitutions are not able to curtail
executives when they invoke the need to protect the citizenry.88
Furthermore, the global executive has emerged over the last several
decades due to the nature of modern conflict and financial globalization,
coupled with the fact that modern crises seemingly always have a global
impact due to the increased interconnectedness of the world. The global
executive, regardless of the geographical location of his country, must
respond to crises like Greece's inability to get their fiscal house in
80. Id.
81. See Chris Thornton, Brits in Northern Ireland: Mission Over, TIME (Aug. 1, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1648606,00.html.
82. See David Turns, The 'War on Terror' Through British and International
Humanitarian Law Eyes: Comparative Perspectives on Selected Legal Issues, 10 N.Y. CITY
L. REV. 435, 446 (2007).
83. See id.
84. See generally MICAH ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., POLICY INNOVATION
MEMORANDUM No. 31: TRANSFERRING CIA DRONE STRIKES TO THE PENTAGON (2013),
available at http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434.
85. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 181 (2008).
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order86 or a group of fundamentalists in rural Yemen.87 In the former
example, heads of state of various EU nations acted collectively as a sort
of global executive, while in the latter example President Obama has
instituted a campaign to target Al Qaeda elements in rural Yemen. 8
These are just two recent and relevant examples of expanding executive
power when a global executive is called on to address issues that a
century ago would not have been of any particular concern. Current
counterterrorism efforts and the examples from Northern Ireland and
Kosovo aptly illustrate how modern security concerns have led to the
emergence of the global executive.
On the economic front, the renowned author Saskia Sassen has
identified four critical developments that have allowed economic issues
to embolden the global executive. These developments include the
building of the global corporate economy; "intergovernmental networks
centered largely on the executive branch" like the Group of 8 (G8), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) interacting almost exclusively with the executive branch; and
the privatization of public functions reducing the legislature's
oversight.89 The combination of global economic and security concerns
has created a situation where an empowered global executive can
exercise transnational power on a daily basis due to the number of
crises with a global scope.
86. See, e.g., John Cassidy, Greek Chaos Threatens World Economy-and Obama, THE
NEW YORKER (May 9, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2012/05/
greek-chaos-threatens-world-economy--and-obama.html (discussing how "if we've learned
(or relearned) one thing in the past few years, it is that modern economies are closely
interconnected. What happens to Greece matters for the rest of Europe, and what happens
to Europe matters for the rest of the world, us included. Contagion and the threat of
contagion are facts of modern life.").
87. See Christopher Swift, The Drone Blowback Fallacy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 1,
2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137760/christopher-swift/the-drone-blowback
-fallacy (discussing the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts in rural Yemen to thwart the
growth of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the use of the executive -driven
drone-strike program).
88. Yara Bayoumy, Insight: In Yemen, Al Qaeda Gains Sympathy Amid U.S. Drone
Strikes, REUTERS, Dec. 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/13/us-yemen-us-
drones-insight-idUSBRE9BC0AO20131213.
89. Saskia Sassen, Shadow Elite: What's Behind Surging Executive Power?




C. The Global Executive, Pashtunistan, and Transnational Security
Law Impacts
When viewing the role of the global executive through the context of
Pashtunistan, it is impossible to avoid focusing on the actions of the
President of the United States, who fits the definition of a global
executive as posited earlier. Whether because the United States faces
the greatest threat of all Western nations from transnational terror
emanating from Pashtunistan or because of another reason, the United
States President is undoubtedly the most engaged global player.
Because of this, the remaining discussion in this section will focus on
the repercussions of current policies and the potential for alternative
policies.
The United States' primary approach to the insecurity in
Pashtunistan, outside of the ground war in Afghanistan, has largely
been characterized by the drone program. In 2010, the President
ordered 118 attacks targeting militants in Pashtunistan, which lead to
the deaths of 581 militants and cost approximately $118 million.90 This
tremendously kinetic approach to addressing the lack of security and
governance provides numerous transnational legal issues. First, the
secrecy inherent in the program and the inability of outsiders, such as
media and civil society organizations, to gain access to Pashtunistan
mean that the program is held to a very low level of public scrutiny or
accountability.9 1 This criticism may be somewhat allayed by the fact
that the executive branch may be subjecting these strikes to a high level
of scrutiny and accountability. However, it is difficult to combat this
criticism due to the concentration of the program within the executive
branch.
The impacts of this lack of transparency on transnational security
law are currently difficult to fully ascertain. Unfortunately, they could
have damaging long-term impacts. For instance, Israel has instituted a
similar drone program that it is using to target militants in Gaza, 92
including the targeted killing of the leader of the Hamas military wing
90. See Selig S. Harrison, America Builds Pashtunistan, THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Feb.
28, 2011), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/america-builds-pashtunistan-4928.
91. See STANFORD INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC ET AL., LIvING
UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN
PAKISTAN (2012), available at www.livingunderdrones.org/report/.
92. See Fares Akram & Isabel Kershner, Israeli Drone Strike Kills Militants in
Southern Gaza, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/mid
dleeast/israeli-drone-strike-kills-militants-in-gaza.html.
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and the subsequent flaring of tensions in November 2012.93 This
program-and its accompanying secrecy-is only the first of what will
likely be many copycat programs throughout the world. This proposition
is made more troubling by the fact that international law does not speak
to how these programs should be governed, audited, or deemed legal.94
With no international legal framework in place, nations with the
capacity to produce drones can look to the United States drone program
as a quasi-rationale and target internal dissidents-or external
dissidents in a country without the capability or power to adequately
respond. This absence of a legal framework threatens to create a race-
to-the-skies mentality that could negatively and permanently impact
modern warfare. A reliable international framework must be developed
to forestall this potential, but the assumed immediacy of threats in
Pashtunistan prevents the development of this framework.
Besides the transparency concerns addressed above, another
concern is the effectiveness of the program and the impact it has on the
local Pashtun population. A global executive, by necessity, takes action
and makes decisions from afar. It is tough to know whether a program
is effective, or even could be effective, without a deep and personal
knowledge of the issue it is addressing. What is known is that the drone
program inherently causes tremendous mental health issues for
innocent tribespeople living in the targeted areas within
Pashtunistan. 95 Others contend that the attacks are radicalizing the
Pashtun people, thereby empowering the local Islamic fundamentalists
who preach resistance against the Pakistani government and the
West.96 This could lead to the conclusion that the global executive's
exercise of power is exacerbating, instead of abating, the security threat
coming from Pashtunistan. The transnational security law impact of a
global executive program that leads to the increased enlistment of
Pashtuns in radical organizations cannot be understated. This
93. See Steve White, "Israel Has Opened the Doors of Hell": Hamas Warning After Air
Strike Kills Commander, MIRROR (Nov. 14, 2012, 7:55 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/
world-news/hamas-leader-killed-by-israel-air-1436385.
94. See, e.g., Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman & Evan Perez, U.S. Unease Over Drone
Strikes, WALL STREET J. (Sep. 26, 2012, 6:59 AM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000
0872396390444100404577641520858011452.html (discussing how Obama administration
officials are attempting to identify a legal framework that could serve to govern the drone
program).
95. See generally STANFORD INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC,
supra note 91, at 20 (describing how "A Pakistani psychiatrist, who has treated patients
presenting symptoms he attributed to experience with or fear of drones, explained that
pervasive worry about future trauma is emblematic of 'anticipatory anxiety,' common in
conflict zones.").
96. See Harrison, supra note 90.
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radicalization could serve to further destabilize conditions throughout
Pashtunistan, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, and lead to the
perception amongst the Pashtuns that the anxiety they feel because of
the presence of drones amounts to state-sponsored terrorism. If the
result of the program is that Pashtuns feel terror must be met with
terror and more young men enter the ranks of terrorist organizations, a
resolution of security issues in Pashtunistan is not likely to occur.
Antonio Cassese argues that a global executive has another option
when addressing transnational terror. This option is referred to as the
"peaceful option," in which a global executive leads an enforcing of
criminal law on the national and transnational levels, sequestrating
assets, and securing international police and judicial cooperation in the
investigation, extradition, and prosecution of terrorist networks and
individual terrorist suspects.97 This option could have more positive
impacts on transnational security law, but one wonders if a global
executive could cede that much authority to a loose process of multi-
state cooperation.9 8 The effectiveness of this "peaceful approach" in an
ungoverned space like Pashtunistan is also precarious at best. With no
effective governance in Pashtunistan, who would the global executive
cooperate with to arrest and extradite terror suspects? How would the
prosecution of these individuals occur? What transnational security law
would be enforced? These questions make the likelihood of this
approach being implemented remote.
The view exists that the global executive has the autonomous ability
to exercise "the employment of unilateral military force to enhance
survival prospects, maximize power, and increase security relative to
other states[, and this exercise of power] is neither ephemeral nor
atavistic, but is rather the fundamental and immutable fact of
international relations."99 This is an impractical manner in which to
employ transnational executive power. The following alternative, which
foregoes the global executive for a multi-state regional solution, is
practical and has the potential to offer a more realistic improvement to
the security and economic conditions in Pashtunistan.
97. See generally Antonio Cassese, The International Community's "Legal" Response to
Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 589, 590 (1989).
98. See DAVID MCCLEAN, INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
MATTERS 6 (2002) (discussing how states historically have been unwilling to seek or
establish international cooperation as a means of prosecuting and punishing terrorists,
opting instead to use solutions within their own law enforcement and legal jurisdictions).
99. William C. Bradford, International Legal Regimes and the Incidence of Interstate
War in the Twentieth Century: A Cursory Quantitative Assessment of the Associative
Relationship, 16 AM. U. INVL L. REV. 647, 654-55 (2001).
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III. LOOKING INWARD TO CONFRONT CURRENT AND FUTURE PROBLEMS
An alternative to the global executive would be to create a new
regional governance organization that could address the security
concerns present in Pashtunistan and throughout the Muslim world.
The scope of this organization, an alliance of Muslim nations who aid
one another in addressing internal and external security concerns,
would be unprecedented in the Muslim world, but there is a model
present for how to build this organization. NATO served its intended
purpose throughout the Cold War and provided reassurance to states as
they confronted post-Cold War difficulties and transnational terror. A
similar organization, made of Muslim nations and designed to provide
security and governance assistance to other Member Nations, could
serve as a viable alternative to the global executive and staunch the
flow of transnational terror from Pashtunistan.
A. The Establishment of NATO, Its Stated Goals, and Current Troubles
To properly understand how this proposed organization would work,
it is necessary to have a cursory understanding of NATO and the
current challenges the alliance faces. This understanding is integral to
extrapolating how a NATO-like organization of Muslim nations would
be constituted and operated.
Following World War II, at the outset of the Cold War, the
signatories of NATO met in Washington D.C. to agree to a security
framework. President Truman and the other signatories felt this
agreement was crucial to countering the potential of the Soviets
enlarging their sphere of influence, and therefore communism,
throughout the world.100 The self-defense portion of the treaty allowed
parties, pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to invoke
the right of collective or individual self-defense if any of the member
100. See NATO ENLARGEMENT 32 (Ted Galen Carpenter & Barbara Conry eds., 1998).
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states were attacked.10' This provision of the treaty was not invoked
until after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.102
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO developed a new
strategic concept that provided an increased focus on threats outside of
Russia or its surrogates.103 This reformulation of the purpose of NATO
explicitly recognized how NATO security interests could be impacted by
"acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption
of the flow of vital resources."104 NATO further articulated their
realization that "[e]thnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes,
inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and
the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional
instability." 05 While this modernization of NATO shows an adaptive
and forward-thinking organization, the alliance is not without its issues.
Foremost among the current issues surrounding NATO is the
perception that it is no longer relevant because Member States do not
have identical levels of commitment to the organization and its aims. In
2008, Defense Secretary Gates expressed his concern about the level of
commitment by NATO Member States when he said, "we must not-we
cannot-become a two-tiered Alliance of those who are willing to fight
and those who are not. Such a development, with all its implications for
collective security, would effectively destroy the Alliance." 06 This
concern that some nations are unwilling to fight has the potential to
erode the alliance from within. This sentiment and fear of erosion is
101. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, which
states in relevant part:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will
assist the Party of Parties so attached by taking forthwith, individual
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.
102. See, e.g., Ben Armbruster, Erdogan Suggests Invoking Article 5 of NATO Charter to
Protect Turkey's Border with Syria, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2012, 11:53 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org /security/2012/04/12/463235/erdogan-article-5-syria/?mobile=nc.




106. Robert M. Gates, United States Secretary of Defense, Speech Delivered at the
Munich Conference on Security Policy (Feb. 1, 2008), available at www.defenselink.mil
/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1214.
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shared by some European members.107 This could be why the
"[plerception in degree to which NATO is deemed essential for security
has dropped by an average of 13 percentage points from 2002 to 2007 [in
European nations] . . . [and only] in the United States has the
perception of the value of the alliance increased."108
These current issues, while significant; are to be expected for an
organization that is sixty-three years old and has been committing
troops to combat operations for the past twelve years. A NATO-like
organization comprised of Muslim nations would confront similar
issues, but if it had the success and resiliency of NATO, it would be
incredibly beneficial to Muslim nations throughout the Middle East and
Southwest Asia.
B. The Potential for and Issues Presented by a NATO-like Organization
Comprised of Muslim Nations
When addressing the potential of a Muslim NATO-like organization
to intervene in Pashtunistan, it is essential to understand the legal
context within which such an organization would operate. Of singular
importance is the fact that nothing in the United Nations Charter
"precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that
such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."109 Additionally, the
United Nations Security Council retains the right "where appropriate,
[to] utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority."110 These two provisions provide solid footing
for this organization to establish itself and operate under the auspices
and approval of the United Nations.
Another indicator that there is a strong potential for a Muslim
NATO-like organization is the existence of the Arab League. The Arab
League was formed in 1945 to "look after their members' economic,
political, cultural, national and religious interests . . . [and to help] the
Arab world grow economically and culturally, while finding solutions to
107. Mihalka, supra note 24, at 62 (former Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar
called NATO a "zombie organization due to the lack of interest from the U.S. side topped
by the lack of commitment from the European allies").
108. Id. at 57.
109. U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1.
110. U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1.
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resolve conflicts both within the league and outside of it.""' While this
twenty-one-member organization could serve as a vessel for the creation
of a NATO-like organization, 112 it would need to overcome criticisms of
ineffectiveness, disunity, poor governance, and over-representation of
Arab dictatorships at the expense of the people.113
There is reason for optimism that the Arab League could expand its
role throughout the region. Recently, during the uprising in Libya, the
Arab League requested that the United Nations Security Council
impose a no-fly zone over Libya.114 This action is indicative of two
potential shifts in the organization's efficacy in dealing with its Member
States' security issues. First, this could signal a shift away from the
Arab League supporting autocratic leaders. While the Member States
have repeatedly been criticized for protecting dictators and shielding
each other from any sort of human rights criticism, the Arab Spring and
its aftershocks may have eliminated this behavior."15 Additionally,
calling for action could be a sign of Arab nations acknowledging the
need to prevent the emergence of ungoverned areas within the region.
Another reason to be optimistic that the Arab League could become
more relevant is the organization's call for international intervention in
Syria. In June 2012, the head of the Arab League, Nabil Elaraby,
requested that the crisis in Syria be submitted to the United Nations
Security Council "as a threat to world peace and security." 16 While this
is a positive sign, the next step would be a request from the Arab
League to the United Nations for authority to intervene with a multi-
national force. It is encouraging that we may be closer to that coming to
pass. In late September 2012, the emir of Qatar made a request to the
United Nations for Arab nations to form a coalition to intervene in Syria
111. Presentation of the Arab League, LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (Sep. 13, 2012),
http://www. arableagueonline.org/hello-world/#more-1.
112. Id. (outlining the Arab League member-states as: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros,
Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman,
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria (currently suspended), Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
113. Jonathan Masters, The Arab League, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 26,
2012), http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/arab-league/p25967.
114. Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over
Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/middleeast/
13libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
115. See Kenneth Roth, Time To Abandon the Autocrats and Embrace Rights, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (2012), http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/time-abandon-autocrats-and
-embrace-rights.
116. David Owen, We Can Intervene in Syria, With Russia's Blessing, THE GUARDIAN
(June 8, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/08/intervene-
syria-russia-un-nato-kosovo-bosnia.
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due to the lack of international involvement in resolving the violence." 7
This is an encouraging development and could provide a roadmap to
resolve the existential security crisis in Pashtunistan.
While there is a tremendous amount of potential for the proposed
organization, it is necessary, at a minimum, to acknowledge the issues
presented by this organization. There are three obvious issues for this
organization: the current sectarian tension between Sunni and Shi'a
sects of Islam, the military capacity of potential Member States,118 and
the ways Member States can address the Iran question. While a
complete discussion of these issues is not central to this analysis, they
must be addressed before a multinational military force is employed by
this organization.
First, Shi'a-Sunni tension is critical because religious identification
is the most prevalent identity marker in the Middle East, before
ethnicity or national citizenship.11 Commentators have stated that this
conflict "forges attitudes, defines prejudices, draws political boundary
lines, and even decides whether and to what extent those other trends
have relevance."120 A balancing of power within the organization could
weaken this conflict. While Shias only constitute 10 percent to 15
percent of the worldwide Muslim population, in the "Islamic heartland,
from Lebanon to Pakistan . .. there are roughly as many Shias as there
are Sunnis."121 This sect population equality within the Middle East
would require a Muslim NATO-like organization to self-govern and
regulate itself to be an effective and legitimate organization. The birth
of more representative governance in the Middle East, as evidenced by
the Arab Spring and democratic protests throughout the region from
2011 to the present day, provides substantial hope that this is possible.
Next, the military capacity of the nations that would comprise this
organization is questionable at the present time. While many nations in
the region have militaries that could not adequately contribute to a
117. Colum Lynch & Anne Gearan, At U.N., Qatar Emir Calls on Arab Nations to
Intervene in Syria, WASH. POsT (Sep. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na
tional-security/at-un-qatar-emir-calls-on-arab-nations-to-intervene-in-syria/2012/09/25/4bf
05a9e-0758-1 1e2-alOc-fa5a255a9258_story.html.
118. This weakness would be a great place for global executive power to be used.
Professionalizing and improving the militaries of these nations, like the United States has
done for the Egyptian military, would aid this organization greatly.
119. See Shibley Telhami, 2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE
3, available at www.brookings.edulviews/speeches/telhami2007O2O8.pdf (discussing that 45% of
respondents described being Muslim as the most important part of their identity, 29%
professing national citizenship was the most important, and 20% saying being Arab was the
most important).
120. VALI NASR, THE SHIA REVIVAL: How CONFLIcTS WITHIN ISLAM WILL SHAPE THE
FUTURE 82 (2006).
121. Id. at 34.
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Muslim NATO-like organization currently, 122 there are two nations that
could carry the load in the near term. First, Turkey, currently a member
of NATO, has a military that is one of the top ten militaries in the world
with over half a million well-equipped and capable soldiers.123 Turkey's
NATO membership has allowed its defensive capabilities to increase
exponentially over the past twenty years. However, Turkey's
commitment to NATO has lessened as Turkey turns its attention south
and east and seeks to become a more significant player in the Muslim
world.124 This drift may be useful as Turkey could be the founding
member of this new organization, and it could depart NATO on positive,
amicable terms. Turkey's military power, concomitant with its increased
focus in the Muslim world, is an encouraging sign that the country
would be willing to shoulder a noteworthy amount of the military
requirements of a Muslim NATO, much like the United States does in
the present-day NATO alliance. The Egyptian military also has the
requisite capabilities to bear a disproportionate amount of the military
burden of the organization, but its involvement is incredibly
circumspect at this time due to their internal struggles after deposing
President Morsi in July 2013.125
Finally, the most serious issue is Iran. The Iranian regime has
shown, through its association with Hamas and Shiite insurgent groups
in Iraq, that it is not currently interested in playing a regional role
beyond advancing its own interests.126 Additionally, the nuclear issue
and the threat of a regional conflict with Israel could negatively affect
the formation of this proposed organization. The hope right now, if this
problem is to be overcome, is that the sanctions on the Iranian
122. Based on on-going internal conditions the militaries of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and
Iran could not participate in any external operation and there would be no desire for
Syrian or Iranian militaries to participate based upon the regimes currently controlling
them.
123. See Yuri Mavashev, Turkey's Defense Power Grows at Pace to Be Envied,
PRAVDA.RU (Jan. 31, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://english.pravda.rulworldlasia/31-01-2012/1203
76-turkey defense-power-O/.
124. See generally Tarik Okuzlu, Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity
to Interests, 35 WASH. Q. 153 (2012) (discussing how the post-9/11 world has caused
Turkey to turn away from Europe, due to differences in interests, and back towards its
Muslim neighbors.).
125. David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi Is Taken into Military
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/
egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
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government lead to an internal revolt that causes regime change
internally along the vein of the Green Revolution seen in 2009.127
C. Transnational Security Law Impacts of a NATO-like Muslim
Organization in Pashtunistan
The transnational security impacts of a Muslim NATO-like
organization intervening in Pashtunistan cannot be overstated. First, it
would allow for a relaxing of the drone program, which could lead to a
decline in the recruitment of Pashtuns by radical Islamic movements.
Additionally, it would foster a global security governance regime where
regional as opposed to global solutions are sought, which is preferable.
Finally, this organization could aid in the development of burgeoning
representative governments in the Middle East as they encounter the
difficulties inherent in embracing a new form of governance.
A global governance regime where regional as opposed to global
solutions are valued would be an incredibly beneficial result of a Muslim
coalition intervening in Pashtunistan. "The basic purpose behind any
regional organization is to foster cooperation among the member
states-to craft a common solution to a common problem . . ., [which]
can take the form of economic and/or financial integration, technical and
cultural exchanges, or collective defense."128
The transnational terrorism problem emanating from Pashtunistan
manifestly affects the Member States of the Islamic world. First, it
directly threatens the existence of two governments- Afghanistan and
Pakistan-and serves as a place to radicalize the youth of other nations
in the region. Next, Pashtunistan's hosting of a transnational terrorist
threat invites the actions of global executives that further destabilize
the region. Finally, Pashtunistan's downward spiral, in terms of
security and governance, is a millstone around the neck of a region that
is attempting to remake itself through a more representative style of
government and discourse following the so-called Arab Spring.
It is this paper's contention that a regional solution is better suited
to address the Pashtunistan "problem" and would lead to a better
resolution. As Mariana Valverde contends, "[w]hat makes one scale
more or less suited to a particular governance task is not simply size,
but also its qualitative dimension-in other words, the kind of priorities
127. See generally Robert Mackey, A Green Revolution for Iran?, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2009), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2009/06/10/a-green-revolution-for-iran/.
128. Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.
L. REV. 235, 236-37 (1997).
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it implicitly sets as certain objects, rather than others."129 The regional,
and not the global, scale is best suited to address the transnational
security problem that is Pashtunitan, if it prioritizes the issue
appropriately.
A drone program overseen by a global executive inarguably has both
its supporters and detractors-positives and negatives. As discussed
supra, numerous observers have commented that the drone program
serves to radicalize the Pashtuns and acts as a rallying cry for the
Islamic fundamentalist recruiter.130 The introduction of a Muslim
military force in Pashtunistan could eliminate this fundamentalist
recruiting tool. Removing this rallying cry of Islamic fundamentalists,
without relieving any pressure on the safe haven they currently enjoy in
Pashtunistan, could serve to reduce the attractiveness of
fundamentalist movements. With Western presence in Iraq no longer a
rallying cry, the fundamentalist movement could see a significant drop
in its ranks if the drone program's role was lessened.
The intervention in Pashtunistan with a multi-national Muslim
force would also signal that the global rule of law is now appropriately
valued by modern governments in the Islamic world. This relaxing of
the drone policy and Muslim intervention in Pashtunistan would
provide time for a comprehensive global agreement to be developed to
address the legal issues surrounding drone programs and their
expansion throughout the communities of nations. All of these
developments would be positive and beneficial to the West and the
Middle East, but only if the intervention in Pashtunistan addressed the
security concerns emanating from there and Western nations were
convinced that their transnational terror concerns were contained and
eliminated.
One apt example of a regional organization placing a priority on
addressing an ungoverned space and successfully intervening, as
endorsed by Valverde, is seen in the African Union's action targeting
the Al-Shabaab terror network in Somalia. In 2007, Al-Shabaab, an Al
Qaeda affiliate founded in Somalia, was on the verge of turning Somalia
into a transnational terrorism headquarters on the scale of Afghanistan
129. Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal 'Technicalities" as Resources for
Theory, 18 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 139, 147 (2009).
130. See Ashley Boyle, U.S. Drones Policy: Strategic Frameworks and Measuring Effects,
AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2012, 3:59 PM), http://americansecurityproject.org
/blog/2012/event-review-u-s-drones-policy-strategic-frameworks-and-measuring-effects/
(discussing how Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula uses the drone program extensively in
its recruiting efforts).
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prior to September 11, 2001.131 In late 2011, AI-Shabaab, largely
unchecked, controlled more than half of Somalia and was involved in
training transnational terrorists, launching pirate attacks, and
collecting millions from exports.132 In September 2012, a joint Kenyan
and African Union military force expelled Al-Shabaab from its last
stronghold, the city of Kismayo.133 Somalia analyst Tres Thomas opined
that the catalyst for defeating AI-Shabaab was the "actual coordination
between Kenya, Ethiopia, the Somali government, AMISOM, and the
proxy militias that all of these groups used to combat al Shabaab ...
[and it's] only recently that they had a coherent and collective vision in
terms of how to defeat al Shabaab on the battlefield."134 This portends
well for the potential effects of a Muslim NATO-like organization
intervening in Pashtunistan. Al-Shabaab, like the Taliban and other Al
Qaeda-affiliated organizations, is a homegrown movement that was
successfully confronted by a diverse alliance of neighboring African
nations.135
A final rationale for supporting a NATO-like organization
intervening in Pashtunistan, as opposed to a global executive, is the
tension-reducing effects it could have across the Muslim world. Many
Muslim nations view the Western classification of controversies and
conflicts in terms of freedom as disingenuous. Muslim nations often feel
that the talk of freedom is instead a "willful insult by a powerful West
intent on maintaining its dominance in Muslim lands . . . [and] if these
differences continue to be viewed through these conflicting prisms, there
is little hope for an accommodation to ameliorate, let alone stop"
violence and aggravation between the West and the Muslim world. 36
While this is a formidable reason to allow the Muslim community to
address Pashtunistan, it cannot be done if it simply serves as a modern
form of appeasement.
131. See generally David Shinn, Al Shabaab's Foreign Threat to Somalia, FOREIGN
POLIcY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (2011), http://www.fpri.org/does/alshabaab.pdf (discussing
how Al-Shabaab's control of significant regions of Somalia resembles the Taliban).
132. See Jeremy Jacobson, Daniel Nisman & Jay Radzinski, Winning the War Against
Al Qaeda in Africa, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52970204840504578086664192947422.html.
133. See id.
134. Armin Rosen, How Africa's Most Threatening Terrorist Group Lost Control of
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18, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/18/globalization and
itsdiscontents (discussing how the anti-Islam film produced in California and placed on




In addressing the Pashtunistan problem, the status quo is not
maintainable or suited to resolve the issues present in this region. It is
naive to believe that a more active Arab League, or Muslim NATO-like
organization, would come without issues. Consensus building among the
Member States on how to deploy and exercise the use of force would be
contentious, just like it is among the signatories of the North Atlantic
Treaty.137 Moreover, an activist group of Muslim nations would likely
cause great concern among the Israeli elite and could be a catalyst for
increased tension between the Arab Member States and Iran.138 While
risk is present in this proposal, a greater expansion of global executive
power is more troubling and not likely to slacken or eliminate the
transnational terror originating from Pashtunistan. The global
executive would find his power more effectively utilized by encouraging
and facilitating a regional solution that is acceptable to a global
audience.
137. See Mihalka, supra note 24, at 63 ("NATO is a consensus-based organization but
there is no consensus about how to proceed with the global war on terrorism, or even if
there is such a war. This lack of agreement severely hampers the development of a
common strategy in Afghanistan.").
138. Iran is a Muslim country, but is largely made up of Persian people with an Arab
minority of three million citizens, or approximately 5% of the population. See Lionel
Beehner, Iran's Ethnic Groups, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Nov. 29, 2006),
http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-ethnic-groups/pl2l18.
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